Abstract| All known constructions of information theoretic t-out-of-n secret sharing schemes require secure, private communication channels among the parties for the reconstruction of the secret. In this work we investigate the cost of performing the reconstruction over public communication channels. A naive implementation of this task distributes 2n ? 2 one times pads to each party. This results in shares whose size is 2n ? 1 times the secret size. We present three implementations of such schemes that are substantially more e cient:
I. Introduction S ECRET sharing schemes were introduced by Blakley 1] and Shamir 2] , and were the subject of a considerable amount of work, e.g., 3]{ 7]. In these schemes, a dealer holds a secret piece of information. Upon system initialization, the dealer gives one \share" of the secret to each of n parties. These shares are distributed privately, and are kept by each party in a secure way. Later on, any authorized subset of the parties (a subset containing at least t parties) collects their shares, and uses them to reconstruct the secret. All known schemes that guarantee information theoretic secrecy require the use of secure, private communication channels between the parties that participate in the reconstruction.
The question we raise in this work is whether reconstruction can be done without assuming that the channels are secure, while maintaining the security of the schemes. We require that after a reconstruction, only the parties who took part will know the secret. We consider the worst case scenario: The \bad" parties can overhear any communication, so from their point of view the channels are public. On the other hand, \good" parties hear only messages sent
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The simplest way to implement such public reconstruction securely is to hand to each party upon system initialization, in addition to his original share, 2(n ? 1) one time pads. These pads are used in order to simulate a private channel on a public one. In the private channel scenario, reconstruction is typically done by exchanging shares among parties. To enable such exchange with every other participant, each party will need two pads per participant: one for receiving a share, and one for sending the share. Thus the simple implementation results in an O(n) multiplicative factor increase in the size of each share.
We design substantially more e cient schemes of three types. The rst type is unrestricted schemes. In these schemes, any number of authorized sets (each containing at least t parties) may reconstruct the secret, after communicating on the public channel. Any disjoint coalition of at most t ? 1 parties does not gain any partial information on the secret, given the coalition's shares and the communication of the sets that reconstructed the secret. We describe unrestricted schemes in which the size of the shares is O(n=t) times the size of the original secret. We complement this result by proving a tight (n=t) lower bound on the increase in the shares' size for any unrestricted scheme. In order to participate in more than one reconstruction, every party that has already reconstructed the secret must store it. This is problematic in applications where an adversary might break into the computer of the secret holder. (One of the advantages of traditional secret sharing is that breaking into the computer of a \share holder" does not compromise the secret.) The unrestricted non-reactive schemes of Section V solve this problem, but the share size there is n times the secret size.
The second type is one time schemes, in which only a single authorized set (containing at least t parties) will reconstruct the secret securely. It is not known during system initialization which set will reconstruct the secret, and the dealer has to accommodate any possible set. For example, these schemes can be used to enable one time activities like the ring of a ballistic missile or the opening of a sealed safe. We describe one-time schemes in which the size of the shares is O(log(n=t)) times the original secret size. Next, we consider one time schemes where one authorized set of size exactly t will reconstruct the secret. Additional parties in supersets with more than t parties jointly have enough information to reconstruct the secret. However, they cannot reconstruct the secret over the public channel, because communicating it from members of the authorized set is not possible in a secure way. This means that the authorized sets that can securely reconstruct the secret do not form a monotone access structure. We design such schemes with just O(1) multiplicative increase in the share size (for any threshold t).
In light of our results, one may wonder if the initial distribution of shares can also be done over public channels. By the properties of \regular" schemes, each participant requires a share whose conditional mutual information with the secret (given the information of t?1 parties) is at least the entropy of the secrets 4]. If the parties start with shares of smaller conditional entropy, then the parties and the dealer cannot increase it by communicating over public channels, even if interaction is allowed 8], 9]. Thus in our model, it is necessary to have secure initial distribution of shares from the dealer to the participants. However, from practical point of view the distribution stage is an o -line process which is typically done upon system initialization (unlike the reconstruction stage). Thus, assuming private initial distribution is reasonable. Some bibliographical remarks: A similar setting of public interaction was considered for interactive key distribution schemes (e.g., 10]{ 12]). Our schemes employ key distribution schemes, though not interactive ones. Another solution for eliminating the use of secure private channels assumes that the parties have limited computing power. A common assumption is that the parties are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines, and the security of the channels is achieved by means of public key cryptography 13], 14]. Public channels have been used in secret sharing (in addition to private channels) in dynamic sharing of secrets. These are schemes where the dealer enables parties to reconstruct di erent secrets in di erent time instants (e.g., 7], 15], 16]). A di erent scenario in which a public broadcast channel is used (in addition to private channels) is to protect against Byzantine parties 17], 18]. Unlike our scenario, in those works the broadcast channel is heard by all parties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we de ne the model, secret sharing schemes, and key distribution schemes. In Section III we describe the unrestricted schemes, and in Section IV the one time schemes. In Section V we introduce non-reactive, unrestricted schemes. In Section VI we provide the lower bound for unrestricted schemes. Finally, in Section VII we summarize our results and give two numerical examples of the sizes of shares in our various schemes.
II. Definitions
In this section we de ne our model, secret sharing schemes (traditional and public channels), and key distribution schemes.
A. The Model
We consider a system with n parties, denoted by fP 1 ; P 2 ; : : :; P n g. In addition to the parties, there is a dealer in the system, who has a secret input s taken from some nite domain S. A distribution scheme is a probabilistic mapping (namely a mapping which depends on the secret and on an independent random input), which the dealer applies to the input, and generates n pieces of information. These pieces of information are called shares, and the i-th pieces is called the share of P i . For every i, the dealer gives the i-th share to P i . The dealer is only active in this initial stage. After the initial stage, subsets of the parties can communicate, according to some pre-de ned, possibly randomized, protocol. The parties are honest, that is, they follow their protocols. However, a subset, disjoint of the communicating subsets, is curious and after the protocol has ended the members of the subset collude and try to gain some partial information about the secret.
De nition 1: Let B be a disjoint coalition (set of parties), and s 2 S the input of the dealer. The probability is taken over the random input of the dealer, and the random inputs of the members outside the coalition. Notice that we do not make any assumptions on the probability distribution of the inputs S. This is desirable since the designer of a scheme does not necessarily know the probability distribution of the inputs that will be used (e.g., there might be only two possible inputs). This idea is inspired by the de nition of probabilistic encryption 14]. An alternative de nition assumes that there is some probability distribution on the inputs, and requires that for every probability distribution the probability of the input, given the view of the coalition, is the a-priori probability of the input. It can be proved that these two de nitions are equivalent 19]. The alternative de nition can be rephrased to state that the conditional entropy of the inputs given the view of the coalition is equal to the original entropy of the inputs. This is a common de nition of secret sharing schemes 4], 20]. We use this latter de nition in Section VI. Another comment is that in general the view of the parties in a coalition includes their local random inputs. However, since we consider only disjoint coalitions which only listen and do not participate in any computation, we can ignore their local random inputs.
B. Secret Sharing Schemes
We de ne both traditional secret sharing scheme, i.e with private channels, and secret sharing schemes with public reconstruction.
De nition 2: Let S be a nite set of secrets. A t-out-ofn secret sharing scheme is a distribution scheme, in which the dealer's input is a secret taken from S, and which satis es the following two conditions: Reconstructability: Any set of parties whose size is at least t can reconstruct the value of the secret after communicating among themselves. Every party in the reconstructing set gets the value of the secret with certainty.
Security: Every disjoint coalition B of size at most t ? 1 has no information on the secret as de ned in De nition 1. There are three variants we consider:
1. Traditional secret sharing schemes in which the reconstruction takes place via secure, private channels. In this case the view of a disjoint coalition is only its shares. 2. Unrestricted secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction in which a coalition B can overhear all communications taking place. The security is guaranteed even if several sets (maybe even all) reconstruct the secret using the public channel. In this case the view of a disjoint coalition is its shares and all the communications that took place. 3. One-time secret sharing scheme in which the security is guaranteed only if one set will reconstruct the secret. It is not known during system initialization which set will reconstruct the secret, and the dealer has to accommodate any possible set. In this case the view of a disjoint coalition is its shares and the communication of one reconstructing set.
The security should hold for any coalition of at most t ? 1 parties. A special case is B = ;, namely a listener who overhears all communications but has no shares should gain no partial information about the secret.
Shamir 2] presented a traditional secret sharing scheme in which the size of the shares is the same as the size of the secrets (for domains of secrets which contain at least n + 1 secrets). The size of shares in Shamir's scheme is the smallest possible, since the size of the share has to be at least as large as the size of the secrets 4]. In traditional secret sharing schemes, while one set reconstructs the secret, no information is leaked to disjoint coalitions (due to the security of the channels). Hence, secure traditional schemes are always unrestricted. Furthermore, in traditional schemes, if a set can reconstruct the secret, then every superset of the set can reconstruct the secret. However, one-time secret sharing schemes with public reconstruction do not necessarily have this monotone property. To satisfy monotonicity, it is required that every party of the superset should know the reconstructed secret. However, it is not necessarily possible to \distribute" the secret to members of a superset without leaking information to other parties.
C. Key Distribution Schemes
We now de ne unrestricted, non-communicating key distribution schemes. (Other variations of key distribution schemes can be found in 10], 11].) These key distribution schemes are used in the constructions of our secret sharing schemes.
De nition 3: Let b be a positive integer such that b n ? 2, and let K be a set of keys. A (2; b) key distribution scheme with n users and domain of keys K is a distribution scheme in which a dealer (who has only a random input) generates n shares such that the following two requirements hold:
Reconstructability:
The shares of every pair of parties G determine a key, which is distributed uniformly over the domain of keys, K. (The key depends on the random input of the dealer.) Each member of the pair G can deterministically reconstruct G's key from his share without any communication.
Security:
Let B be any (\bad") coalition of cardinality at most b, and G be a disjoint pair of parties. The coalition B has no information on the key of G, as de ned in Definition 1. In this case their view is the collection of their shares.
The security requirement is with respect to the key of a single pair. It does not guarantee that a coalition cannot gain information on relations between di erent keys (e.g., the coalition might know that the keys of two pairs are equal). However, the security does guarantee some independence between keys. Consider a (2; 2t ? 3) key distribution scheme, a coalition B of t?1 parties, and a disjoint set G of t parties. From the point of view of the coalition, the ? t 2 keys of pairs of parties in G are distributed uniformly and independently (for a proof see 11]). Blom 21] constructed e cient (2; b)-key distribution schemes. For every prime-power q (where q n) he presented a scheme in which the keys are taken from GF(q) and the shares are taken from GF(q) b+1 . Blundo et. al . 10] proved that this is optimal, namely the shares cannot be taken from smaller domains.
III. Unrestricted Schemes
In this section we construct unrestricted secret sharing schemes with public reconstruction, in which the size of the share of every party is O(n=t) times the size of the secret. We rst describe a simple scheme in which the size of the shares is 2n ? 1 times the size of the secret. Our O(n=t) construction can be viewed as an optimization of this simple scheme. In this scheme, the dealer shares the secret using Shamir's secret sharing scheme 2]. The dealer also deals to every pair of parties two random strings whose size is the same as the size of the secret. These two random strings, which we call keys, are given to the two parties of the pair, and will be used as one-time pads. Overall, every party receives 2(n?1) keys, each one with the same size as the secret. When the parties in a set of size at least t wish to reconstruct the secret, all the parties \send" their shares to the \leader" of the set, say the party with minimal index in the set. The leader gets at least t shares (including his own), which enable him to reconstruct the secret. Then, the leader \sends" the secret to the other parties. The parties use their keys as one time pads to simulate private channels. Speci cally, let P i0 be the party with smallest identity in the set. Every party P i , holding the share s i from Shamir's scheme, adds s i and the rst key of the pair hP i0 ; P i i and sends this sum over the public channel (this is an addition in the appropriate nite eld). The party P i0 can reconstruct all the shares from these messages, and therefore reconstruct the secret. Now, P i0 sends messages, one message to every party in the reconstruction set. For every party P i , he adds the secret and the second key of the pair hP i0 ; P i i and sends this sum over the public channel. Since the one-time pads are independent, coalitions of parties disjoint to the reconstructing set do not gain any information on the shares or the secret. Furthermore, even if many reconstructions take place, this does not leak any information to a disjoint set.
Suppose P i0 is the leader in a set of size at least t. In the previous scheme, during the reconstruction for this set, only the keys that were given to P i0 were used. To improve the space e ciency we will use all the keys of the parties in the reconstructing set. Following 11], we partition the secret into t sub-secrets, and share each subsecret using Shamir's scheme. Now we choose t parties of the reconstructing set, and each one will be responsible for reconstructing one sub-secret. Each party will act as the leader in the previous scheme. That is, every leader receives shares from the other t ? 1 leaders (this is enough), but sends his sub-secret (after reconstruction) to every member of the reconstructing set. This way we can handle t sub-secrets \at the price of one". The domain of the secrets in the scheme is GF(q) t , where q is a prime-power such that q > n. (We require that q > n since this is the requirement in Shamir's scheme.) In the scheme we view the secret as t sub-secrets from GF(q). The scheme is presented in Fig. 1 .
As described, the scheme has two technical points which should be clari ed. The rst is the fact that in one reconstruction two parties P i and P j might need to exchange 4 di erent messages: Assume that P i is responsible for reconstructing the sub-secret s i 0 , and P j is responsible for reconstructing the sub-secret s j 0 . The party P i has to receive from P j the share corresponding to the sub-secret s i 0 , and then will send the sub-secret s i 0 . Similarly, P j has to receive from P i the share corresponding to the sub-secret s j 0 , and then will send the sub-secret s j 0 . This is the reason for giving them 4 common keys. The second di culty is that in di erent reconstructions the same party can be responsible for di erent sub-secrets. This means that P i will have to send to P j two di erent messages, using the same key as a one time pad. This might leak information to disjoint coalitions. To overcome the problem, every party that participates in one reconstruction will remember the secret, and in later reconstructions will inform other parties (in the clear) that he knows the secret. In such case, other parties will not send him any messages. He will continue to send the messages that he has to send according to the scheme (to \new" parties). Thus, every key is used as a one-time pad at most once (in the rst reconstruction that the pair participates together). Therefore, the scheme satis es the unrestricted security requirement.
Let us calculate the size of the share of every party in this unrestricted scheme. Each party is given t shares generated by Shamir's scheme for secrets taken from GF(q). The dealer also distributes to each party 4(n?1) keys taken Reconstruction stage:
A set G = P i 1 ;: : :; P i` wants to reconstruct the secret Every party in G announces whether he has previously reconstructed the secret. Let P i j for 1 j t be the leaders of G. Each leader P i j (1 j t) sends (at most) t ? 1 messages to all other leaders that have not previously reconstructed the secret: s j 0 ;i j + k 1 i j ;i j 0 to P i j 0 for 1 j 0 < j s j 0 ;i j + k 2 i j ;i j 0 to P i j 0 for j < j 0 t Each leader P i j computes s j from s j;i 1 ;: : : ;s j;it . Each leader P i j sends a message to every P i j 0 2 G that has not previously reconstructed the secret: s j + k 3 i j ;i j 0 to P i j 0 for 1 j 0 < j s j + k 4 i j ;i j 0 to P i j 0 for j < j 0 È ach party of G concatenates the sub-secrets s 1 ;s 2 ; :: : ;st to obtain the secret s. from GF(q). Hence, each share contains (4n + t ? 4) elements from GF(q), compared to t elements from GF(q) for the secret. We summarize these results in the the next theorem.
Theorem 4: Let q be a prime-power such that q > n. The above mentioned scheme is an unrestricted t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction for secrets taken from GF(q) t . The share of each party is an element of GF(q) 4n+t?4 . So the size of each share is 1 + 4(n ? 1)=t times the size of the secrets.
IV. One-Time Schemes
In the unrestricted scheme, we need totally independent keys in order to guarantee the security of the scheme during repeated reconstructions. In this section we deal with the scenario where the secret is going to be reconstructed only once. For example, to enable the ring of a ballistic missile or opening of a sealed safe. In this case, total independence among the keys is not needed, and weaker independence requirements su ce. Shares can therefore be taken from a smaller sample space, which translates into smaller size shares. Speci cally, we use Blom's key distribution scheme 21] for this purpose.
The rst scheme we present enables one-time reconstruction of the secret by sets of size exactly t. The size of the shares is a constant (less than 10) times the size of the secret, namely only O(1) increase in shares' size. We employ this \exactly t" scheme as a building block for \at least t" schemes. We use 1 + log(n=t) independent instances of \exact schemes" for thresholds t; 2t; 4t; : :: up to n, and an additional instance of size t. Now, given any set G withp arties (` t), we represent it as a union of subsets (not necessary disjoint) with cardinalities t; 2t; 4t; : : : { at most two subsets of cardinality t and at most one subset of cardinality 2 i t for each i 1. The secret is now separately reconstructed by each subset. Any member of G takes part in at least one of these reconstructions, and thus learns the secret. On the other hand, any disjoint coalition containing at most t?1 parties gets no partial information on the secret from any single instance. Due to the independence of the instances, this remains valid with respect to the joint reconstructions. We get a one-time scheme for set of size at least t, with just O(log(n=t)) increase in share size. We now describe in detail the \exactly t" scheme. The distribution phase is depicted in Fig. 2 .
Distribution in Exactly t-out-of-n one-time scheme Input: secret s 2 GF(q) t .
Consider the secret as t secrets s 1 ;: : : ;st 2 GF(q). Share each secret s i using Shamir's t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme.
Let b = minf2t ? 3;n ? 2g.
Generate shares using a (2;b)-key distribution scheme with key domain GF(q) 4 (considered as 4 keys from GF(q)).
Share of P j : the j-th share of each s i , and the share of the key distribution scheme. The reconstruction is done exactly as in the unrestricted scheme. The security of one reconstruction of a set of exactly t parties follows from the property of (2; 2t ? 3) key distribution schemes discussed in Section II-C: Given the shares of any disjoint coalition of at most t ? 1 parties, the keys held by any set of size t are distributed uniformly and independently. Thus, when used as one-time pads, the reconstruction is secure (using the same arguments as in the unrestricted case). This scheme uses t shares of Shamir's t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with secrets taken from GF(q). In addition, each party gets a share of Blom's (2; 2t ? 3) key distribution scheme with keys taken from GF(q) 4 { these shares are taken from GF(q) 4(2t?2) . Overall, the total share contains (9t ? 8) elements from GF(q) (if 2t > n + 1, then the shares are even shorter). Recall that the secret is taken from GF(q) t , and therefore the size of the share is less than 9 times the size of the secrets.
In this scheme, the domain of secrets has to be GF(q) t (for some prime-power q). Restricting the domain of secrets to such cardinality can cause problems when we employ simultaneously many schemes with the same secret but with di erent thresholds. To overcome this, given any domain of secrets we consider a slightly bigger domain whose size (which can depend on the threshold) is of the desired form. That is, given a secret of size m which is at least t logn, we choose a prime power q such that m t log q, and use the previous scheme with secrets of size m 0 = t log q.
Choosing q = 2 dm=te , we have m 0 = t dm=te m + t.
If we assume that m > 9t then the size of the share is 9m 0 9(m + t) < 10m
Theorem 5: Let m be a natural number such that m > maxft logn; 9tg. There exists a one-time secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction for exactly t-out-of-n, in which the size of the secret equals m, and the size of the share of each party is less than 10 times the size of the secrets.
One-time schemes are a special case of traditional secret sharing schemes even if only sets of size exactly t can securely reconstruct the secret, since every set of at least t parties has enough information to reconstruct the secret on secure private channels. Thus, the size of each share has to be at least the size of the secret 4]. Therefore, our scheme is tight up to a constant factor. We can slightly improve this lower bound, by observing that every one-time exactly t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction can be used as a one-time communicating (t; t?1) key distribution scheme (for t n=2) (for de nition of communicating key distribution scheme see 11]). The size of the share in every (t; t ? 1) key distribution scheme is at least twice the size of the key 11]. Therefore, the size of the share in every one-time secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction is at least twice the size of the secret.
In Fig. 3 we describe the one time scheme in which every set of at least t parties can securely reconstruct the secret.
One-time Secret Sharing Scheme Distribution stage: Input: secret s of size m Share the secret s using two independent copies of a one time exactly t-out-of-n secret sharing schemes. For every i, 1 i < log(n=t):
Share s with an exactly 2 i t-out-of-n one time secret sharing scheme.
Reconstruction stage:
A set G = P i 1 ; : :: ; P i` that wants to reconstruct the secret (where` t). Cover the set G by (possibly intersecting) sets of size 2 i t (at most one set for every i > 1, and at most 2 sets of size t). Each set of size 2 i t independently reconstructs the secret using the shares of the exactly 2 i t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme. Fig. 3 . One-time t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction Theorem 6: The scheme of Fig. 3 is a one-time t-outof-n secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction in which every set of parties of size at least t can securely reconstruct the secret. If the size of the secrets m is larger than maxfn log n; 9ng, then the size of the shares of every party is less than 10(log(n=t) + 2) times the size of the secrets.
Remark 7: If we require that the size of the secret m is greater than n 2 log n, then we can construct a scheme in which the size of the shares is only 2 log(n=t) + O(1) times the size of the secret, i.e. a smaller leading constant. To achieve this goal we use a slightly weaker building block (instead of the exactly t-out-of-n scheme). This building block is a scheme in which exactly 2 i t parties can reconstruct the secret, while any coalition of size t ? 1 does not gain any information on the reconstructed secret. Schemes which satisfy this requirement on secure, private channels were presented by Blakley and Meadows 22] (see also 3], 4] and 23]), and are called ramp schemes. We use ramp schemes instead of regular secret sharing schemes to design our building boxes. Assume that sets of`parties should be able to reconstruct the secret, while sets of fewer than t parties should get no information about the secret. The size of the share in such ramp scheme is 1=(`? t + 1) times the size of the secret, i.e. substantially smaller than traditional secret sharing schemes.
For the scheme with public reconstruction, assume that the domain of secrets is GF(q)`(`? t+1) . That is, the dealer has`secrets, each one taken from GF(q)`? t+1 . The share of each party is one share of the ramp scheme for`sub-secrets, each share taken from GF(q). In the reconstruction of the secret by a subset containing exactly`parties, each party will be responsible for one sub-secret. Each pair of parties in this set rst exchanges two shares of the ramp scheme. Now each party reconstructs his sub-secret, and every pair of parties exchange two sub-secrets. Therefore, every pair of parties needs two keys of a (2;`+ t ? 3)-key distribution scheme with keys from GF(q) (the domain of shares of the ramp scheme), as well as two keys from a (2;`+ t ? 3)-key distribution scheme with keys from GF(q)`? t+1 (the domain of sub-secrets). Overall, the share of each party is an element taken from GF(q) 3`+2t?4+2(`+t?2)(`?t+1) . That is, the size of the share is 2 + 2t=`+ O(1=(`? t)) times the size of the secrets. In the t-out-of-n scheme for every set, we use these schemes with`= t; 2t; 4t; : : : { therefore the size of the share is only 2 log(n=t) + O(1) times the size of the secret. In this construction we required that the size of the secret m is greater than n 2 log n, this requirement can be weakened to m n log 3 n.
V. Unrestricted Non-Reactive Schemes
A secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction is called non-reactive if the messages sent by each party depend only on his share (and not on messages received during the reconstruction). Non-reactive schemes are simpler to implement, as they require less synchronization. Therefore, they are desirable from practical point of view. In this section we present non-reactive, unrestricted t-out-ofn schemes. The size of the shares in these schemes is n times the size of the secret. This represents a slight improvement (by a factor of 2) over the reactive scheme of Section III for t = 2, but is strictly less e cient (in terms of share size) for t 5. We extend these schemes to general access structures. The size of the share in our public reconstruction schemes is n times the size of the share in the original scheme. For general access structures it is typically not a signi cant increase, as the best schemes for most access structures to date require shares whose size is exponential in n.
We rst present a simple, non-reactive, 2-out-of-n secret sharing scheme. Let s 2 Z m be the secret which the dealer wants to share. The dealer chooses n independent random elements from Z m , denoted r 1 ; : : :; r n . The share of P i is r 1 ; : : :; r i?1 ; r i + s; r i+1 ; : : :; r n . Each share is uniformly distributed in Z n m , regardless of the secret. Hence, prior to any reconstruction every party has no information on the secret (as de ned in De nition 1). To reconstruct the secret, P i sends the message r j , and P j sends the message r i . Now, P i , who holds r i + s, hears the message r i , so he can reconstruct the secret. Every third party hears messages that he already knows, and gains no information on the secret. That is, the reconstruction is secure. The size of the shares in this scheme is n times the size of the secret. During the reconstruction in this scheme every party is deterministic and sends only one message that depends only on its share.
In a general secret sharing scheme, rst suggested by 24], we are given a collection A of sets of parties called an access structure. We require that every set in A can reconstruct the secret, while every set not in A does not jointly know anything about the secret. Secret sharing schemes satisfying these requirements can exist only for monotone collections. Indeed, it is known that for every monotone collection there exists a traditional secret-sharing scheme 24]{ 26]. However, the size of the shares in these schemes is typically exponential in the number of parties (i.e., of size m2 (n) where n is the number of parties in the system and m is the size of the secret).
Let A be any monotone access structure. The unrestricted, non-reactive, 2-out-of-n scheme can be generalized to an unrestricted, non-reactive scheme realizing the access structure A. Assume there is a traditional secret sharing scheme realizing A with domain of secrets S and domain of shares U. In our scheme we use the following observation: Denote by A i the access structure A i = fB : B fP i g 2 Ag. There exists a traditional secret sharing scheme realizing A i in which the domain of shares is U ( x some possible share u for P i , and share the secret using the scheme for A conditioned on the fact that the share of P i is u). We now describe an unrestricted, non-reactive scheme realizing A with domain of shares S U n?1 . To share a secret s, the dealer chooses n random independent elements from S, the domain of secrets, denoted r 1 ; : : :; r n . For every i, the dealer distributes the share r i + s to P i , and shares r i among fP 1 ; : : :; P i?1 ; P i+1 ; : : :; P n g using the scheme realizing A i with domain of shares U. That is, the share of P i is r i + s together with the shares of the n ? 1 schemes realizing A 1 ; : : :; A i?1 ; A i+1 ; : : :; A n with secrets r 1 ; : : :; r i?1 ; r i+1 ; : : :; r n respectively. The total share is an element taken from S U n?1 . Now, when a subset B wishes to reconstruct the secret, every P i 2 B sends (in the open) the share of the secret r j to every P j 2 B. Thus, P i holds r i + s and hears the shares of B n fP i g from the scheme realizing A i with the secret r i . Since B n fP i g 2 A i , the party P i can reconstruct r i , and with r i + s reconstructs the secret. We next claim that the reconstructions are secure. That is, every coalition C 6 2 A hearing communications during the reconstruction of the secret by all sets in A that are disjoint to C does not gain information on the secret. The coalition C is not in A i for any P i 2 C, thus, the shares of C give no information on r i for P i 2 C. Hence, prior to any reconstruction the coalition C has no information on the secret even if it knows r i for every P i 6 2 C. But the information that the coalition gains from the communication is at most the r i 's for P i 6 2 C, and it does not gain any information on the secret. That is, the reconstruction is secure. Thus, Theorem 8: Assume there exists a (traditional) secret sharing scheme realizing A with domain of secrets S and domain of shares U. Then there exists an unrestricted, non-reactive secret sharing scheme realizing A with public reconstruction for secrets taken from S. The share of each party is an element of S U n?1 . So the size of each share is at most n times the size of the shares in the original scheme.
We can apply the previous construction for threshold schemes using Shamir's scheme.
Corollary 9: Let q be a prime-power such that q > n. There exists an unrestricted, non-reactive t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction for secrets taken from GF(q). The share of each party is an element of GF(q) n . So the size of each share is n times the size of the secret.
VI. Lower Bounds for Unrestricted Schemes
In this section we prove an (n=t) lower bound on the increase in the shares' size for unrestricted t-out-ofn schemes. The speci c lower bound that we prove is tight for t = 2 (by the non-reactive scheme of Section V). For t > 2 our lower bound is tight up to a constant factor (by the reactive scheme of Section III). We rst prove an (n) lower bound on the increase in size of shares for 2-out-of-n schemes. Then, we show that this lower bounds translates into an (n=t) increase for t-out-of-n schemes.
We start with the lower bound for t = 2. The proof uses entropy and mutual information. For de nitions of these information theoretic terms, the reader can refer to 27]. We assume an arbitrary probability distribution on the secrets, and we denote the secret by the random variable S.
The intuition behind the proof is that P i has to expose H(S) \new" bits of his share in each reconstruction, and P i can participate in n ? 1 reconstructions. After all n ? 1 reconstructions, the uncertainty of the share of P i has to remain at least H(S), as an outsider who listened to all reconstructions still has H(S) uncertainty on the secret. Thus, the original entropy of the share has to be at least n H(S).
Without loss of generality, we prove the claim for P 1 . To prove the lower bound on P 1 's share, we only use the requirement that P 1 can reconstruct the secret together with every other P j (we do not care if other pairs can or cannot reconstruct the secret). We start with some notation. Denote by S i the share given to P i in the initial distribution phase, and by C j the messages exchanged when P 1 and P j reconstruct the secret (all these are random variables). We denote C = C 3 : : :C n , the concatenation of all messages exchanged between P 1 and the parties P 3 ; : : :; P n . Recall that the communication C 2 , together with P 2 's share S 2 , enables P 2 to reconstruct the secret S. On the other hand, the communication C and S 2 give no information (to P 2 ) about the secret. These facts will imply the next claim. Proof: Since P 2 can reconstruct the secret S, given his share S 2 and the messages C 2 exchanged between P 1 and P 2 , the conditional entropy H(SjC 2 S 2 ) equals 0. On the other hand, P 2 gets no information about the secret S from his own share S 2 and all messages C exchanged between P 1 and the other n ? 2 parties. Therefore the conditional entropy H(SjS 2 C) equals H(S). Now, consider the conditional mutual information I(C 2 ; SjS 2 C) of the message C 2 and the secret S, given the share S 2 and C. We have Since the entropy is non-negative, H(C 2 jS 2 C) H(S).
The next claim is the heart of the proof of the lower bound. It states that the mutual information between S 1 and C 2 given the \other" communication C is at least H(S). Intuitively, since P 2 does not know the secret prior to the reconstruction, and knows it after the reconstruction, P 2 has to receive H(S) bits of information which could only originate in S 1 and passed through the communication C 2 . Hence, C 2 must contain H(S) bits of information originating from the share S 1 . Claim 11 is stated for deterministic parties { the outgoing messages are determined by the given share and previous incoming messages. An analogous statement is proved in Section VI-A for randomized parties, whose outgoing messages could in addition depend on random local inputs.
Claim 11: For deterministic reconstruction protocols we have I(C 2 ; S 1 jC) = H(S 1 jC) ? H(S 1 jC 2 C) H(S) :
Proof: Since P 1 and P 2 are deterministic, and their domain of shares is nite, there is a bound k on the maximum number of communication rounds which can take place during the reconstruction of the secret. Denote by A i the i-th message sent by P 1 to P 2 , and similarly, let B i be the i-th message sent by P 2 to P 1 We are now ready to prove our lower bound for t = 2. We next show that this lower bounds on increase in size of shares for 2-out-of-n schemes translates into (n=t) increase for t-out-of-n schemes. Theorem 13: In every unrestricted t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with public reconstruction the size of the shares of every party is at least b1 + (n ? 1)=(t ? 1)c times the size of the secrets.
Proof: Consider any t-out-of-n scheme. Denote the party whose share is shortest by P 1 . We construct an unrestricted 2-out-of-(b1 + (n ? 1)=(t ? 1)c) scheme in which the entropy of S 1 { the share of P 1 { is the same. Hence, by Claim 12 its entropy is at least (b1 + (n ? 1)=(t ? 1)c)H(S). Since the scheme is secure whatever the distribution on the secrets is, we can assume uniform distribution on the secrets. In this case H(S) = logjSj, which is the size of the secret. Since H(S 1 ) logjS 1 j, the size of the share of P 1 is at least b1 + (n ? 1)=(t ? 1)c times the size of the secrets.
The construction is simple: the dealer gives P 1 the share of P 1 in the original scheme, and every other party gets shares of t?1 disjoint parties. Since every party has at most t?1 shares, he does not gain any information on the secret even after hearing communications. On the other hand, every 2 parties have at least t shares, therefore they can communicate on a public channel, and securely reconstruct the secret.
A. Lower Bound for Probabilistic Parties
In the proof of Claim 11 we assumed that the parties are deterministic during the reconstruction of the secret. In this section we prove the same claim without this assumption. Recall that S 1 is the share of P 1 , C 2 is the communication generated in the reconstruction of the secret by P 1 and P 2 , and C is the communication in previous reconstructions. We prove that the mutual information between S 1 and C 2 given C is at least the entropy of the secret, even if the parties may toss coins during the reconstruction. That is, party P 1 has an independent local random string, denoted R 1 , and the messages he generates are a deterministic function of his share, his random input, and previous messages. As the claim concerns the share of P 1 , we can assume that other parties in the system are deterministic (the dealer can supply a random string to the other parties as part of their shares). Since R 1 is independent of the shares and the secret, the mutual information between R 1 and the shares and the secret is zero, i.e. I(R 1 ; SS 1 S 2 : : :S n ) = 0 : We rst quote a general claim from 8] and 9, Lemma 2.2] which states that the mutual information between the inputs of the parties can only decrease by communicating over public channels. We next prove that the mutual information between R 1 and the shares of other parties, given S 1 and a communication M is zero (where M is any pre x of CC 2 ). The claim can be proven directly by induction on the number of messages sent in M (this is the way that Claim 14 is proven). We avoid this induction as we show that our claim can be formulated as a special case of Claim 14.
Claim 15: Let M be a pre x of the communication exchanged between the parties in the system. Then, H(R 1 j SS 2 S 1 M) = H(R 1 j S 1 M) .
Proof: Consider a scenario in which one party holds R 1 , and a second party holds the secret S and all the shares { S 1 ; S 2 ; : : :; S n . They communicate via a public channel and the rst message is sent by the second party and equals S 1 . From now on, the rst player can generate the messages of P 1 and the second player can generate all other messages. Thus, the two parties can continue to communicate and generate M. By Claim 14, communicating S 1 and M can only decrease the mutual information, that is, We restrict our discussion to protocols with an absolute bound k on the number of rounds in each communication C j . (The case where the protocol terminates after a nite number of rounds with probability 1 can be handled similarly.) Denote by A i the i-th message sent by P 1 to P 2 , and similarly, B i to be the i-th message sent by P 2 to P 1 . I.e, C 2 = A 1 B 1 : : :A k B k . We next prove that the dependence of A i on S 1 and the previous messages is greater than the dependence of A i on S 2 , the secret S, and the previous messages. Formally, (2) Recall that the communication C and the share S 2 give no information (to P 2 ) about the secret, i.e. H(SjS 2 C) = H(S). On the other hand, P 2 holding S 2 and knowing C 2 , can reconstruct the secret, i.e. H(SjS 2 CC 2 ) = 0. Therefore, H(SjS 2 C) ? H(SjS 2 CC 2 ) = H(S). Together with Inequality (2), we get I(C 2 ; S 1 jC) H(S), as claimed.
Claim 17 implies that Theorem 13 holds also in the scenario in which the parties can toss coins during the reconstructions.
VII. Conclusions
In this work we investigated the cost of performing the reconstruction over public communication channels. In Fig. 4 we summarize our results for the various schemes. We denote by m the size of the secret, and the sizes of the shares are multiples of m (e.g., 10m). We also give the minimum size of secrets for which this share size applies. In Fig. 5 we give two examples of the sizes of shares in the various schemes. In both examples we consider a system with 1024 parties.
share size min. secret size Naive (2n ? 1)m log n Non-reactive nm log n Unrestricted (1 + 4(n ? 1)=t)m t log n One-time 10(log(n=t) + 2)m maxfn log n; 9ng One-time, exactly t 10m maxft log n; 9tg share size minimum secret size n = 1024 ; t = 128 Naive scheme 2047m 10 bits Unrestricted scheme 33m 160 bytes One-time at least t scheme 40m 1280 bytes One-time exactly t scheme 10m 160 bytes n = 1024 ; t = 8 Naive scheme 2047m 10 bits Unrestricted scheme 513m 10 bytes One-time at least t scheme 80m 1280 bytes One-time exactly t scheme 10m 90 bytes 
